


David Ben-Gurion



Zionism was an international political movement that began in the late 1800's, founded in Europe, inspired by its culture, and embedded in its history, with the goal of creating a Jewish state somewhere in the world. In this sense, the history of the Zionist presence in Palestine belongs to European history.

In 1897 this movement, led by European journalist Theodor Herzl, coalesced in the First Zionist Congress, held in Basel, Switzerland, which established the World Zionist Organization, initially representing 900 groups.

Chaim Weizmann

During the early years of WW I Chaim Weizmann took an important part in the negotiations that led up to the Balfour Declaration. By 1920, he became head of the World Zionist Organization. Although he did important work in the foundation of Israel, and was its first president, his doctrines of caution antagonized extremist politicians, he alienated Ben-Gurion, and was never elected Prime Minister.

<https://www.britannica.com/biography/Chaim-Weizmann>

Ben-Gurion

The page references Segev, p xxx below refer to Israeli New Historian Tom Segev's book:

A State At Any Cost: The Life Of David Ben-Gurion

Born as David Grün in Płońsk in Congress Poland, then part of the Russian Empire, to Polish Jewish parents, Ben-Gurion's interest for Zionism developed early in his life. He immigrated to Palestine in 1906, became executive head of the World Zionist Organization in 1946, and is considered by many to be the founding father of Israel.

Though revered by the Israeli community, his actions and writings were fraught with conflicting impulses.

Embryo for the Plan for Greater Israel, "Eretz Israel"

The embryo of the idea for "Greater Israel" appeared in the writings of Herzl in 1904, who said before it existed, that the area of the Jewish State stretches "From the Brook of Egypt to the Euphrates." ¹

According to the official history of the early Israeli militant group Haganah, in the summer of 1937, Ben-Gurion, anticipating British withdrawal from Mandatory Palestine, requested a plan be drawn up for the military conquest of the whole of Palestine. This led to the Plan Dalet of March 10, 1948. The plan was to take control of Mandatory Palestine, declare a Jewish state, and then take control of those areas outside the borders of the proposed Jewish state where Jews had settled.

The plan involved laying siege to Palestinian Arab villages, bombing neighborhoods of cities, forced expulsion of their inhabitants, and setting fields and houses on fire and detonating TNT in the rubble to prevent any return. Zionist military units possessed detailed lists of neighborhoods and villages to be destroyed and their Arab inhabitants expelled.²

Ben-Gurion Wobbles

On a summer morning in 1939, a deafening explosion woke up the inhabitants of Jerusalem's pastoral Rehavia neighborhood. **Segev, p. 278**

Two young Jewish men had thrown a bomb at a car carrying Arab laborers. "Who knows what will happen if we do not mobilize in the war against these Jewish gangs," Ben Gurion wrote. He was referring to Etzel, or Irgun, the Revisionist's National Military Organization, whose members had split away from the Haganah in 1931. They believed in reprisals and refused to countenance Ben-Gurion's policy of restraint. They threw bombs at Arab buses, stores, and cafés; some of their attacks were deadly. Ben-Gurion maintained that the Haganah should be made "available for action against Etzel, by which he meant it should cooperate with the Mandate authorities.

But, like illegal immigration, the war against Arab terror was seen as a test of national loyalty. Restraint was seen as weakness, and revenge as heroism and moral strength. **Segev p. 279**

Still, he reasoned, the psychological need for revenge could only be justified in a military operation if it were morally or politically mandated and could only be carried out under his authority and with his sanction. He gave in to them again, just as he had done with illegal immigration. In the summer of 1939, a revenge organization was established that, for all intents and purposes, was under his command in his capacity as chairman of the Jewish Agency Executive. These "Special Squads," as they were called, were considered an elite unit. Its members specialized in terror attacks against Arabs. **Segev p. 279**

British 1939 White Paper

Unable to maintain peace, Britain tried to win over Arab opinion by abandoning the Balfour Declaration and issuing the 1939 white paper, which limited Jewish Immigration. This was to be followed by Arab majority independence.³

Ben Gurion had further problems, for although he was seeking immigrants, not many European Jews wanted to go to Palestine, until it was too late. Further, immigrants were often seen as weak, even by Ben Gurion, and were often discriminated against.

Of course, the U.S. was a major player in the UN. Zionist leaders felt that the U.S. was critically important to their goal. David Ben-Gurion, who had visited the United States almost every year after his election to the Zionist Executive, wrote in 1939 that he was convinced that “the main arena” for Zionist efforts outside Palestine should be America, stating that they had “no more effective tool at our disposal than the American Jewish community and Zionist Movement.”⁴

With a new White Paper on Palestine taking form in London, Ben-Gurion proposed an immigration rebellion. “Without a major, daring, goal-directed deed ... we will not be able to prevent the ruin of Zionism at this moment,” he said. To succeed, boats needed to be purchased and a network of smugglers established in Germany, Austria, Poland, Greece, and Romania.

Segev p. 283

MacDonald’s White Paper was issued on May 17, 1939. It stated that an independent, bi-national state would be established in Palestine within ten years. In the meantime, restrictions would be placed on the transfer of Arab land to Jewish ownership. The number of Jews permitted to settle in Palestine in the five years to come would not exceed seventy-five thousand. The intention was that the Jews constitute a third of the population. Any further Jewish immigration beyond this number would require Arab consent. Ben-Gurion proclaimed that Britain had, essentially, revoked the Balfour Declaration. “The Devil himself could not devise a more crushing and horrible nightmare,” he wrote in his diary.

Segev p. 285

Israel considered British restriction of Jewish immigration into Palestine condemned them to be victims of the Holocaust. Although Ben-Gurion opposed war with Britain, the result was years of Israeli insurgency retaliation on the British.

Haganah terror attack on British and Jewish German immigrants

At the beginning of November 1940, two ships that had set out from Romania came into Haifa’s port. A third ship joined them at the end of the month. Together they bore thirty-six hundred passengers, most of them Jews from Germany and Austria. They had arrived without immigration certificates. The authorities announced that the refugees would be deported to the island of Mauritius in the Indian Ocean. In preparation for their deportation, about seventeen hundred were put on a ship named the Patria. Segev p. 299.

Ben-Gurion proposed a compromise. From this point forward the British fleet would not allow boats carrying Jewish refugees to reach Palestine’s shores, but the refugees who had already arrived would be allowed to stay. Weizmann did not succeed in acting on this suggestion, because five days later the Haganah placed a bomb in the Patria. The explosion killed about 250 of the passengers, as well as several British servicemen.

Israel Fear of Nazis

Saturday, September 7, 1940, was a horrible day in London. Close to the hour at which the British customarily take their afternoon tea, 350 German bombers and 600 warplanes appeared in the sky and began to drop hundreds of tons of bombs on the city. The attack lasted all night, and by Sunday morning there were nearly 900 dead and another 2,000 wounded.

(segev p. 293).

The next day, on September 9, 1940, Italian planes bombed Tel Aviv's city center. More than a hundred people were killed. Ben-Gurion's response was terse. "What I feared has come to pass. The Italians have commenced operations to obliterate the Hebrew community." Not since 1929 had so many Jews been killed in Palestine all at once.

(segev p. 294).

It seemed quite possible that the Nazis could conquer Palestine, and at times it seemed a near and immediate certainty. The records of the discussions held then in the Jewish Agency Executive testify to disarray and even more to a lack of leadership. No one knew what would happen, everyone agreed that something had to be done, but everyone also agreed that there was no way to stop the Germans.

Segev p.335

The Sonneborn Institute 1945

Haganah leadership feared that, with the war over, the British would seek to destroy the Haganah. The organization needed money, and Ben-Gurion agreed. Six weeks after the end of the war in Europe, Ben-Gurion rushed to the United States carrying a list of wealthy and trustworthy Jews, and asked Rudolf Goldschmidt Sonneborn to invite them to a meeting.

Segev 366

This was the birth of what came to be called the Sonneborn Institute, a support group whose members raised money and sent to Palestine more or less everything that was needed for the war against the Arabs for Palestine, including combat aircraft. It was all accomplished in coordination with Haganah personnel who came for that purpose from Palestine, often under cover, with forged papers, false identities, and secret codes. Instead of "dollars" they used the word "books." Some of the military equipment had to be smuggled into Palestine under the guise of spare parts for agricultural machinery. In time, the operation expanded into enlisting American volunteers who went to Palestine to fight in the Haganah's ranks.

Segev (p. 368).

Jewish Gangsters Helped Found the State of Israel

After World War II, close aides of David Ben-Gurion, who would later become the first prime minister of Israel and was instrumental in the founding of Mossad, forged tight-knit relationships with Meyer Lansky, Benjamin "Bugsy" Siegel, Mickey Cohen and other Jewish gangsters of the period. They used their clandestine networks to establish a vast arms smuggling network between the United States and Zionist settlements in Palestine, arming both the Haganah and the Irgun paramilitary groups. At the same time these gangsters were aiding the illegal arming of Zionist paramilitaries, they were strengthening their ties to U.S. intelligence that had first been formally (though covertly) established in World War II. ⁵

This covert activity in the United States marked a dramatic shift in what had been Ben-Gurion's policy up to this time. No more did he advocate loyal cooperation with the British, as partners in government, operating openly and lawfully. Now he favored the prudent use of the arts of secrecy and subterfuge, and especially ambiguity of language. That seems to have been the main lesson he learned from Zionism's impotence during the Holocaust.

p. 369

Ben-Gurion's Double Game 1945

In September 1945, it was reported that Truman had promised that he would get one hundred thousand displaced persons (DPs) to Palestine. The British reacted in the usual way—they appointed a commission of inquiry, a joint Anglo-American body, with six representatives from each government. The composition of the body showed the British no longer assumed sole responsibility for the future of Palestine, and the United States was stepping up.

Richard Crossman, a journalist and Labour member of Parliament served as a member of the committee,

On March 26, 1946, Ben-Gurion stood before a justice of Britain's Supreme Court and claimed that he had no idea what the Haganah was. The judge, Sir John Edward Singleton, was one of the committee's co-chairmen. He did not believe Ben-Gurion. He asked Ben-Gurion the same question nine times in a row,

(p. 376).

One of the American members of the committee, James McDonald, saw "great strength and indomitable determination" in Ben-Gurion: "I can understand why he is so natural a leader." Crossman wrote, in contrast, that Ben-Gurion's testimony left a bad impression on the panel. It was a propaganda speech.... They especially disdained his attempt to evade responsibility for acts of terror.

Weizmann, who spoke prior to Ben-Gurion, impressed the committee in particular with his sincerity.

(p. 379).

The members of the committee wondered how a Jewish-majority state in Palestine could ensure equal rights for the Arab minority that would live among it. Ben-Gurion responded that there was no reason for concern. The Arabs of Palestine, he proclaimed, would never be a minority, as they were part of the Arab world, with its hundreds of millions of inhabitants who would surround the Jewish state. The members of the committee were not convinced—not because they thought he was lying, or perhaps not only because they thought he was lying, but because it was one of the principal internal contradictions in his argument, one that he did not reconcile to their satisfaction. Crossman was appalled by the double game Ben-Gurion played after the Holocaust—obedient recognition of British rule, along with terror aimed at bringing it to an end.

(p. 380).

Bombing of King David Hotel.

Violence culminated in the July 22, 1946, false flag bombing of the King David hotel in Jerusalem by the Zionist terrorist group Irgun, disguised as Arabs. More than ninety people were killed.

Great Britain decides to leave Palestine

The winter of 1947 was one of the harshest in London's history; February was its cruelest month. The coal crisis was at its height, heavy snows blocked fuel trucks, unemployment continued to rise. The British Empire was in the midst of a profound crisis and was about to come apart.

p. 365

Oliver Stanley, a senior British official, had already confided to Ben Gurion several years previous that Britain could not afford to lose the friendship of the Arabs, but did not know how to decide between them and the Jews. That being the case, it would leave Palestine. Ben-Gurion later related that he had known as early as 1936 that "the Mandate was over," because the British reached the conclusion that they could not keep their hold on Palestine.

On April 2, 1947 Britain, burned by the fury of the Zionists, formally requested that the U.N. General Assembly set up the Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP). ⁶

This committee proposed UN General Assembly Resolution 181, which recommended that the British mandate over Palestine be ended and that the territory be partitioned into two states, Israel and Palestine, with Jerusalem held separately under international control. While the plan was accepted by Jewish Agency for Palestine and most Zionist factions, who viewed it as a stepping-stone to territorial expansion, it was rejected by the Arabs on the basis that Arabs formed a two-thirds majority and owned a majority of the lands. The plan allocated 55% of the land to the Jewish state despite Palestinian Arabs numbering twice the Jewish population.⁷

1947-1948 Arab-Israeli Civil war

Consider what Ben-Gurion wrote in his diary on January 1, 1948, at a time when he was involved in a series of important meetings with other Zionist leaders about how to deal with the Palestinians in their midst: "There is a need now for strong and brutal reaction. We need to be accurate about timing, place and those we hit. If we accuse a family—we need to harm them without mercy, women and children included. Otherwise, this is not an effective reaction . . . There is no need to distinguish between guilty and not guilty."⁸

On May 15th, 1948, Ben-Gurion announced the creation of a new state, to be called "Israel," with no boundaries and no constitution, a situation that continues today.

One of Ben-Gurion's first actions as Prime Minister was to found the Israeli Defense Forces, the IDF. Mossad was formed on December 13, 1949, on Ben-Gurion's recommendation. Together with the army's intelligence department (Aman), and the Internal Security Service (Shin Bet), Mossad provided Israel's security services. In March 1951, it was reorganized and incorporated into the prime minister's office, reporting directly to the prime minister of Israel. Ben-Gurion soon announced "we should prepare to go over to the offensive with the aim of smashing Lebanon, Trans-Jordan, and Syria, " and if Egypt dares to resist, we'll bomb Port Said, Alexandria, and Cairo. ⁹

888

p. 365-66

Summer 1954: Operation Susannah: The Lavon affair:

Operation Susannah was a failed false flag operation conducted against Egypt in the summer of 1954. As part of this operation, a group of Egyptian Jews were recruited by Israeli military intelligence to plant bombs inside Egyptian, American, and British-owned civilian targets: cinemas, libraries, and American educational centers. The attacks were foiled.

A special Israeli committee determined that the bombing had been carried out without Lavon's knowledge. However, he was forced to resign. This is perhaps because he enraged Ben-Gurion by appearing before the (Israeli) Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, where he described a series of IDF fiascos and failures, and criticized Ben-Gurion's nuclear policy. Israel denied any involvement in the incident until 2005.¹⁰

For more details, see IDF icon.

1955 Operation Black Arrow:

During Operation Black Arrow (*Mivtza Hetz Shaḥor*), carried out on the night of February 28, 1955, approximately 150 Israeli paratroopers crossed more than three kilometers into Egyptian-controlled Gaza and launched a coordinated assault on an Egyptian army camp near the Gaza railway station. The Egyptian-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission [determined](#) in UN document S/3373 that the attack was “a prearranged and planned attack ordered by Israeli authorities” carried out by regular army forces. The Israeli forces struck the military camp, a water-pump facility vital to local infrastructure, and the railway station master’s house using mortars, anti-tank weapons, hand grenades, bangalore torpedoes, and explosives. A separate unit ambushed an Egyptian military truck rushing reinforcements. The attack ended with eight Israelis and thirty-seven Egyptians dead,

The operation was authorized by Ben-Gurion as Defense Minister. [Moshe Dayan](#), appointed IDF Chief of Staff in December 1953, had been the chief architect of Israel's aggressive retaliation doctrine since taking that post, a record that included the October 1953 Qibya massacre.

For more details, see IDF icon.

Ben Gurion's Interaction with JFK

Israel, under Ben Gurion, was upset with JFK for a number of reasons:

JFK's support of UN resolution 194 for the right of Return of Palestinian refugees. Ben Gurion wrote letters intended to be circulated among Jewish American leaders in which he stated "Israel will regard this plan as a more serious Danger than all the threats of the Arab dictators in Kings then all Arab armies that all of NASA's missiles and in Soviet MIGS. Israel will fight against this implementation down to the last man."

Waldren p. 28

JFK's determination to reduce the influence of the Israeli Lobby. Due to his efforts a ruling was made that by virtue of its funding coming in through the state of Israel, the American Zionist Council must be registered as a foreign agent and therefore subject to the obligations defined by the foreign agent's registration Act of 1938. After JFK's assassination, the procedure against AZC was buried. AZC's lobbying division AIPAC, became the most powerful special interest group in American political life.

Waldren p. 30-31

JFK's determination for a UN program for complete disarmament from nuclear weapons. JFK took steps in the US towards that goal. Following the impetus of the two Imperial Powers, all countries would cooperate towards nuclear disarmament. All countries but one.

Israel and the Bomb

In the early 1950s, David Ben Gurion, as both prime minister and defense minister, entrusted Shimon Perez to start the secret manufacturer of atomic bombs. Abraham Feinberg assisted Ben Gurion in an unsuccessful attempt to deceive Kennedy regarding ongoing work on building of atom bombs at Dimona. **Waldren p. 31 f**

Ben-Gurion made note of the fact that uranium had been discovered in the Negev desert . He mentioned it again two and a half years later, and four months after that wrote that "we need to obtain a million Israeli pounds for a reactor (heavy water and more) from the development budget." In the autumn of 1954, large headlines proclaimed that Israel was extracting uranium and had developed a method for producing heavy water.

segev p. 601-602

Israel and France signed a nuclear agreement, to participate in an international conference at the Weizmann Institute in Israel. Robert Oppenheimer arrived in Israel to attend that conference. His conversation with Ben-Gurion in the early summer of 1958 might have been decisive. He warned Ben-Gurion that Egypt was liable to obtain nuclear arms. "He said that he was horribly apprehensive about Israel's fate as a result of Egyptian-Russian relations, and especially the matter of the atomic reactor. He sees it as a great menace," Ben-Gurion related. Oppenheimer proposed that Israel bring the matter before the UN Security Council, but also, according to Ben Gurion "In his [Oppenheimer's] opinion, we must do everything to ensure that we have an atomic power station, as soon as possible,"

Segev p. 605-606

The goal of “developing atomic power” was included in the ten-year plan that Ben-Gurion placed before the Cabinet in 1957. In response to a question from one of the ministers, he said: “I am excluding all the security matters; I am speaking at this point about atomic power for industrial needs.”

Segev p 607

A number of Israeli officials were opposed to bringing nuclear power to Israel. It was a new subject; the record of the Cabinet’s discussion shows that the ministers were confused about the terminology. Most of them had trouble fathoming what Ben-Gurion’s actual intentions were, and some thought he was misinforming them, either intentionally or because he himself did not understand the concepts involved.

Segev p. 608

French technicians and engineers had been a presence on the streets of Be’er-Sheva and Dimona for some time, and everyone thought they knew what had brought them there. In December, reports on the construction of the reactor began to appear overseas. The New York Times said that the CIA chief had briefed President-elect John Kennedy about it

Segev p. 624-625

“Should Israel make an atom bomb?”

The question was part of a symposium the newspaper sponsored, alongside the question of whether Eichmann should be executed. Ben-Gurion’s statement averted an open confrontation with the United States for the time being, but behind the scenes the relations between the two countries took on a new and threatening dimension.

Segev p. 625

When Lavon appeared before the (Israeli) Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, he had described a series of IDF fiascos and failures—and criticized the nuclear policy led by Ben-Gurion and Peres. That, apparently, was his major sin, as Ben-Gurion saw it. The Dimona project had been controversial from the start; it was opposed in part on principled and policy grounds, but much of the antagonism was personal. Politicians, scientists, military figures, businessmen, and all sorts of visionaries and adventurers knew that they were witnessing the creation of a new entity of huge power and influence. They often acted as if they assumed that whoever controlled Dimona would control the country.

Segev pp. 625-626.

Like many military leaders, Yitzhak Rabin believed that the available funds should be put into strengthening the army, with the goal of conquering the West Bank, not spent on a nuclear option.

Mapam??? opposed nuclear proliferation, in the spirit of the international left and the Soviet Union. Sharett wrote that the project was “the product of adventurism and arrogance” on the part of Ben-Gurion and Peres.

His brief tenure as defense minister left Lavon as a secondary character in this drama, but from the start he had looked like a political rival to Peres and Dayan, and thus to Ben-Gurion and the nuclear project as well.

“What Lavon told the Committee is the criminal act of a madman whose passions have driven him insane,” Ben-Gurion maintained. “He should be brought to trial. There is a limit! My limit is when security is damaged.”

The Committee of Seven found that Lavon had not given the order and that the operation in Egypt had been carried out without his knowledge.

Segev p. 626

¹ <https://www.globalresearch.ca/greater-israel-the-zionist-plan-for-the-middle-east/5324815>

² . https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plan_Dalet

³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_the_State_of_Palestine

⁴ Weir p. 35

⁵ *Gangsters for Zion*

<https://www.tabletmag.com/sections/arts-letters/articles/gangsters-for-zion>

The Jewish gangsters who helped found the State of Israel

<https://www.jfeed.com/news-israel/sojf9s>

⁶ **ERIC** <https://www.archives.gov/education/lessons/us-israel>

⁷ Wiki Partition Plan Ibid

See also Weir p. 44

“Zionists pushed for a General Assembly resolution to give them a disproportionate 55 percent of Palestine. While they rarely announced this publicly, their plan, stated in journal entries and letters, was to later take the rest of Palestine.”

⁸ Mearsheimer and Walt p. 99 refers to note 95: Quoted in Pappe, *Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine*, 69.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Ethnic_Cleansing_of_Palestine

⁹ Ben Gurion ref: attack arabs

¹⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lavon_Affair