

Harry Truman



UN partition Plan

On April 2, 1947 Britain, burned by the fury of the Zionists, formally requested that the U.N. General Assembly set up the Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCO)

1

This committee proposed UN General Assembly Resolution 181, which recommended that the British mandate over Palestine be ended and that the territory be partitioned into two states, Israel and Palestine, with Jerusalem held separately under international control. While the plan was accepted by Jewish Agency for Palestine and most Zionist factions, who viewed it as a stepping-stone to territorial expansion, it was rejected by the Arabs on the basis that Arabs formed a two-thirds majority and owned a majority of the lands. The plan allocated 55% of the land to the Jewish state despite Palestinian Arabs numbering twice the Jewish population.

2

Of course, the U.S. was a major player in the UN. Zionist leaders felt that the U.S. was critically important to their goal. David Ben-Gurion, who had visited the United States almost every year after his election to the Zionist Executive, wrote in 1939 that he was convinced that “the main arena” for Zionist efforts outside Palestine should be America, stating that they had “no more effective tool at our disposal than the American Jewish community and Zionist Movement.

3

Zionist Pressure on U.N. General Assembly

Passage of the resolution required a two-thirds majority of valid General Assembly votes. On 25 November 1947 the UNSCOP voted in favor of the plan. Various sources noted that the General Assembly, even with US support, was one vote short of the two-thirds majority required. On 26 November 1947, after filibustering by the Zionist delegation, the vote was postponed by three days.

The delay was used by supporters of Zionism in New York to put extra pressure on states not supporting the resolution.

4

Robert Nathan, a Zionist who had worked for the U.S. government and who was particularly active in the Jewish Agency, wrote afterward, "We used any tools at hand," such as telling certain delegations that the Zionists would use their influence to block economic aid to any countries that did not vote for partition. Zionist pressure on France, Latin America, and the Philippines is documented. Ten senators, as well as Truman advisor Clark Clifford threatened the Philippines. Seven bills were pending in Congress.

5

State Department, War Department, and Intelligence Community Voiced Strenuous Objections To Partitioning of Palestine

The head of the State Department 's Division of Near Eastern Affairs, Gordon P. Merriam, warned that without consent of Palestinians, "bloodshed and chaos" would follow. Weir p. 48, Note 194 p. 161 Neff, Donald. *Fallen Pillars: U.S. Policy towards Palestine and Israel since 1945*. Reprint Ed. Washington D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 2002. <https://archive.org/details/fallenpillarsusp0000neff> p. 42-43

On May 4, 1948 Dean Rusk wrote to Under Secretary of State Lovett: "Military operations after May 15th will probably be undertaken by the Haganah with the assistance of the Jewish terrorist organizations Irgun and Stern. ...the Jews will be the actual aggressors against the Arabs. However the Jews will claim that they are merely defending the boundaries of a state which were traced by the UN and approved, at least in principle by 2/3 of the UN membership.

...it is probable that Arab armies from outside Palestine will cross the border to aid their brethren who will be the objects of Jewish attack... In that event the Jews will come running to the security Council with the claim that their state is the object of armed aggression and will use every means to obscure the fact that it is their own armed aggression against the Arabs inside Palestine which is the cause of Arab counter-attack.

There will be a decided effort, given this eventuality, that the United States will be called upon by elements inside this country to support Security Council action against the Arab states. To take such action would seem to me to be morally indefensible ...

Neff, Donald. *Fallen Pillars: U.S. Policy towards Palestine and Israel since 1945*. Reprint Ed. Washington D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 2002.

<https://archive.org/details/fallenpillarsusp0000neff> Draft Memorandum Rusk to USS Lovett Appendix 9 p. 219

Note: Weir p 49 note 198 p.162 Neff, *Pillars*, p. 63 "Memorandum of conversation by Secretary of State" Top Secret, may 12 1948 FRUS 1948 p975-76

The "Department of War" transformed into United States Department of Defense on 18 September

1947 as the National Military Establishment.

Mark Perry, a senior analyst at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, wrote on the military arguments against a Jewish state in Palestine. Truman's Secretary of State General George Marshall (1947-1949), the renowned World War II General and author of the Marshall Plan, was furious to see electoral considerations taking precedence over policies based on national interest.

<https://foreignpolicy.com/2010/04/02/petraeus-wasnt-the-first>
[Patraeus Wasn't the First.pdf](#)

On March 31, 1948, the Joint Chiefs predicted that "the Zionist strategy will seek to involve [the United States] in a continuously widening and deepening series of operations intended to secure maximum Jewish objectives." The JCS speculated that these objectives included eventual extension of Jewish sovereignty over all of Palestine and the expansion of "Eretz Israel" into Transjordan and into portions of Lebanon and Syria.

Secretary of Defense James Forrestal was outraged that Truman's Mideast policy was based on what he called "squalid political purposes," asserting that "United States policy should be based on United States national interests and not on domestic political considerations."

Weir p 50 note 200 p. 162 Neff, *Pillars* p. 29

Kermit Roosevelt, Theodore Roosevelt grandson and a legendary intelligence agent noted: the present course of world crisis will increase upon Americans the realization that their national interests and those of the proposed the Jewish state in Palestine are going to conflict. It is to be hope that Americans Zionists and non Zionist alike will come to grip with the realities of the problem.

Weir p 51 note 205 p.166 ball, *Passionate Attachment* p. 22; Kermit Roosevelt, "The Partition of Palestine: A Lesson in Pressure Politics," *The Middle East Journal* II no. 1 1948 p. 13-16

US Politics in the UN Partition plan

Of course, the U.S. was a major player in the UN. Zionist leaders felt that the U.S. was critically important to their goal. David Ben-Gurion, who had visited the United States almost every year after his election to the Zionist Executive, wrote in 1939 that he was convinced that "the main arena" for Zionist efforts outside Palestine should be America, stating that they had "no more effective tool at our disposal than the American Jewish community and Zionist Movement.

6

The Democratic Party, a large part of whose contributions came from Jews, informed Truman that failure to live up to promises to support the Jews in Palestine would constitute a danger to the party.

Clark Clifford, Truman's political advisor, believed that U.S. Jewish vote and contributions were essential to winning the upcoming presidential election, and counseled Truman that supporting the partition plan would garner that support.

Weir p. 49 note 197 p. 161-162;

Lawrence Davidson, "Truman the Politician and the Establishment of Israel"

Journal of Palestine studies 39,no 4 2010;

www.palestinestudies.org/journals.aspx?id=10710&jid=1&href=fulltext

There were about a million dues-paying Zionists in the U.S. Then, as now, in addition to unending political pressure, there was financial compensation.

Weir p. 51 note 207 p. 167; Gore Vidal, Forward to *Jewish history, Jewish religion: the weight of three thousand years* by Israel Shahak

<https://ifamericansknew.org/curl/sit/shahak.html>

Abraham Feinberg, a wealthy businessman, and the Zionist lobby played a critical role in financing Truman 's victory.

Weir p. 52 note 209 p. 168.; Richard D McKinzie, "Abraham Feinberg Oral History Interview" Truman Library, New York New York August 23rd 1973

www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/feinberg.htm

Feinberg played a similar role with President Johnson.

Weir p. 51 note 208 p. 168 Abraham feinberg's FBI file, Israel Lobby archive access to January 1st 2014, <http://www.irmep.org/ila/feinberg>

When the CIA later discovered that Feinberg also helped to finance illegal gunrunning to Zionist groups, the Truman administration looked the other way.

Weir p. 52, Note 210 p. 168-169 Grant Smith, *Declassified deceptions*,34-37 the Israel Lobby archive, Institute for research: Middle Eastern policy, accessed January 1st 2014.

<http://irmep.org/ILA/default.jsp>

This weapons smuggling and other zionist preparations for war we're well known to British and American analysts, who knew from the beginning that the Arabs would be certain losers in a war with Zionists, whose well-trained and armed combatants out-numbered the Arabs similar combatants by at least four to one." Analysts were also aware that the Zionist plan was to expand beyond their partition allotment. Ball, *Passionate Attachment*, page 24

Truman ignores all concerns in support of Zionist partition plan

Weir p. 49, note 197 p. 161 f

The Israeli lobby 'moved into high gear' and induced the President to overrule the State Department, "and let wavering governments know that the U.S. strongly desired partition."

7

Truman was, according to Roger Cohen, embittered by feelings of being a hostage to the lobby and its 'unwarranted interference'.

UN General Assembly Resolution 181 Passes

On Nov 29, 1947, UN General Assembly Resolution 181, the resolution creating a partition along with the state of Israel, was said to be adopted or passed.⁸ While this resolution is frequently cited, its validity has been questioned.⁹ In his argument, international jurist Henry Cattán referenced several other legal experts.¹⁰ A 2010 article posted in Foreign Policy Journal by activist Jeremy Hammond summarizes the arguments.¹¹

Regardless of the validity of resolution 181, it triggered the violence the US State Department and Pentagon had predicted. Large-scale fighting broke out between the Arab and Jewish communities in Palestine, known as the 1947-1948 Civil war. The U.N. eventually managed to create a temporary and very partial ceasefire.

Author John Snetsinger writes "Truman's Palestine-Israel policy offers an extraordinary example of foreign policy conducted in line with short range political expediency rather than long range national goals:

John Snetsinger, *Truman, the Jewish Vote, and the Creation of Israel* Stanford, CA: Stanford University 1974, p. 140

May 27 1949: The acting Secretary of State wrote to president Truman: The new Israeli government would like a portion of Southeastern Lebanon, desires to acquire from Egypt the Egyptian occupied Gaza Strip, allotted to the Arabs under Resolution 181. Israel further states they will retain occupied areas such as Western Galilee and Jaffa, Lydda and Ramle, Allotted to the Arabs under the partition plan. Israel will relinquish none of the Negev.

May 28 1949: US urges Israel to honor Palestinian refugees right of return Israel was asked to honor United Nations General Assembly Resolution 194, granting Palestinian refugees the right to return to their homes (repatriation) after the war. On July 6 1949 the consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) responded that the state of Israel has no intention of allowing the return of refugees. The return is physically impossible because Arab houses and villages, including those in areas not given Israel by the partition decision, have been occupied.

¹ ERIC <https://www.archives.gov/education/lessons/us-israel>

² Wiki Partition Plan Ibid

See also Weir p. 44

"Zionists pushed for a General Assembly resolution to give them a disproportionate 55 percent of Palestine. While they rarely announced this publicly, their plan, stated in journal entries and letters, was to later take the rest of Palestine."

³ Weir p. 35

⁴ Wiki

⁵ Weir p. 54 Another Zionist noted: "Every clue was meticulously checked and pursued." Even the smallest and remotest of nations was contacted and wooed. "Nothing was left to chance." Zionist

pressure on France, Latin America, and the Philippines is documented. Ten senators and Clark Clifford. P. 55

⁶ Weir p. 35

⁷ Wiki

⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Partition_Plan_for_Palestine

1948 Map: <https://israeled.org/u-n-partition-map/>

⁹ Weir p. 56 UN recommendation:

General Assembly resolutions, unlike Security Council resolutions, are not binding on member states. For this reason, the resolution requested that “[t]he Security Council take the necessary measures as provided for in the plan for its implementation,” which the Security Council never did. Legally, the General Assembly Resolution was a “recommendation” and did not create any state

also see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Partition_Plan_for_Palestine

¹⁰ Weir Note 226 p 171:

International jurist Henry cattan in his 1988 book The Palestine question, writes that the resolution was ‘ vitiated by several gross irregularities.’

1; first out that the UN General Assembly did not have the authority to partition Palestine. He writes ‘ the UN possessed no sovereignty over Palestine, nor the power to deprive the people of Palestine of their right of Independence. Hence, the UN resolution for the partition of Palestine possesses no value, in law or in fact, as acknowledged by a number of leading jurists’

Carttan quotes Pitman B Potter’s article in the American Journal of international law volume 42 1948 page 860: “The United Nations has no right to dictate a solution to mPalestine unless a basis for such Authority can be worked out such has not been done this far.”

Potter goes on to point out that Arabs denied The Binding force of the Mandate and the Balfour Declaration, and says they are probably quite correct juridically’

Cattan also called Professor Quincy writes 1968 address to the association of the bar of the city of New York; ‘ the legality of the general assemblies recommendation for partition of Palestine was doubtful’

2: denial of Justice. A second irregularity was that the general assembly refused to refer questions of its competence on the matter to the international court of justice for an advisory opinion. Catan writes ...

3: Cattan points out that the resolution violated article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, which previously recognized the independence of the people of Palestine.

4: The resolution was also ‘a violation of the charter of the UN and the principle of self-determination of the people of Palestine’

5: The resolution violated 'the most Elementary Democratic principles by the flagrant disregard of the will of the majority of the original inhabitants who opposed partition of their Homeland'

6: Cattán also points out the 'undue influence' of the US president (and others) in passing the resolution.

7 He discusses the iniquity of the plan of partition pointing out that the petition plan attributed to the Jews who constitute less than 1/3 of the population who were largely foreigners and who less than 6% of the land an area almost 10 times greater than what they owned.

Cattán concludes 'this was not a partition but a spoilation.'

¹¹ The myth of the UN creation of Israel, October 26th 2010

<https://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2010/10/26/the-myth-of-the-u-n-creation-of-israel/>